We study a simple exchange model in which price is fixed and the amount of a good transferred between actors depends only on the actors' respective budgets and the existence of a link between transacting actors. The model induces a simply-connected but possibly multi-component bipartite graph.
graph is successful if and only if the graph consists of components each of which are complete bipartite. For the case that supply exceeds demand, we prove that the other topologies also can be made successful but with finite reserve (i.e., excess supply) requirements that may grow proportional to the number of buyers. Finally, with computations for a small instance of the model, we provide an example of the wide range of performance in which only the connectivity varies. These results taken together place limits on the improvements in performance that can be expected from proposals to increase the connectivity of sparse exchange networks.
Introduction
Networked infrastructures are designed to efficiently deliver goods between actors; furthermore, they are designed to continue functioning even if some components of the network fail. In most such infrastructures, suppliers maintain a reserve against a range of likely demand scenarios. One class of strategies to reduce such reserve requirements, and central to Smart Grid [1, 2] proposals, for example, employ a dramatic increase in the connectivity of the network and the exchanges that take place on them [3] . On the other hand, an increase in network connectivity may under some circumstances degrade rather than improve network performance, as illustrated by, e.g., the venerable Braess paradox and its variations [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] . Therefore we want to assess the impact of those proposed upgrades to networked infrastructures that increase its connectivity between actors. As a first step we study a simple model of exchanges between non-cooperative actors. In particular, we will show that it is easy to generate Braess-like paradoxes wherein the ability to meet all demands is degraded by nothing more than increasing the number of links.
Description of the Exchange Model

Trading between a buyer and a seller
First we consider an unsupervised bilateral trade between a buyer b with demand D b and a seller s with supply S s ; alternatively we may consider the exchange of two goods with "supply" as one good and "demand" as the other good. We assume that the trade exchanges supply for demand at a fixed unit exchange rate (price). The roles of seller and buyer are fixed, e.g., buyers do not become sellers. We signify the access of buyers to sellers with a link between the two actors. Trading is not optional; a trade between a buyer and seller must occur when (a) there exists a link between the buyer and the seller (b) the buyer has positive demand (c) the seller has positive supply. The amount traded is the maximum that can be traded given the available supply and demand (but see the end of 3.1 where we relax this requirement). Therefore at least one actor's supply or demand is always reduced to zero, i.e., if the buyer with demand D b = δ trades with seller with supply S s = σ, the result of the trade will be that the buyer is left with max(0, δ − σ) and the seller is left with max(0, σ − δ) (e.g., see Figure 1 ). This simple budget-constrained exchange model [11, 12] deviates from both other exchange models [13, 14] and standard assumptions of economics [15] because we abandoned the classical concept of bi-modal traders by instead fixing an agent as either a buyer or a seller and we imposed a more restrictive specification of trading preferences; see [12] for a full discussion).
Trading between many buyers and sellers
The exchange model [11] employed here then consists of a fixed set of N b buyers (with total demand D) and N s sellers (with total supply S). Throughout we will assume S = D. The L links between buyers and sellers induce a bipartite graph (see Figure 2 ); e.g., the case in which all buyers are accessible to all sellers is the complete bipartite graph K N b ,Ns .
We define a trading session: Because each link trades at most once, it may happen that a trade never occurs over a link because a buyer or seller has been depleted by trades on other links. It may therefore happen that a demand remains unmet at the end of the trading session. Therefore we define "feasible" and "successful" as follows: 
Statement of the problem
The complete bipartite graph K N b ,Ns is apparently successful according to Def. 3 if supply equals demand. On the other hand, inspection of Figure   2 shows that there is also a minimally connected multi-component bipartite graph that is successful. We ask, given a set of initial demands and initial supplies, which graphs are successful? We suspect that for some graphs there would be some orderings of the exchanges in which at least one demand would not be met at the end of the session: indeed we show in the next section that it is necessary and sufficient for each component (for which, within that component, supply equals demand) to be complete bipartite in order to be successful.
Results
Statement and Proof of the Theorem
Here we characterize the topology of successful (order-independent) graphs.
First we state and prove a useful lemma. Then we state and prove the main theorem. Base case Consider a configuration with a single buyer b and a single seller s connected by a link l and S s equals D b . If we remove l, the resulting configuration cannot be successful. Therefore, G 1,1 must be K 1,1 for the demand of b to be reduced to zero at the end of the trading session.
Induction hypothesis Assume for all N b < m and N s ≤ n or N b ≤ m and N s < n, that C N b ,Ns must be K N b ,Ns and supply must equal demand for C N b ,Ns to be successful. Therefore G m,n must be K m,n in order to have all demand reduced to zero at the end of every trading session.
If we relax the requirement that the amount traded is the maximum that can be traded given the available supply and demand, the theorem would still hold because a trading session could still use that maximum amount or combine successive trades to give the same result.
Enumeration
Here we study a special case (see Figure 2 ) in order to directly enumerate the outcome of trading sessions. The graph in Figure 2 translates into large reserves that would be required by the sellers in order to meet demands on such graphs.
Statement and Proof of a Reserve Lower Bound
Here we characterize the reserves that would be required by sellers in order to meet demands on unsuccessful graphs in the worst case. Each seller s i is connected to a buyer b i . Now create an unsuccessful graph by adding links between seller s 1 and buyers b 2 , b 3 , b 4 , ..., b N b . The supply for s 1 would have to be increased to N b · D in order for this graph to be successful.
Computing the Maximum Reserve Requirement
Here we give a nonlinear program to calculate the maximum demand left unmet in an unsuccessful graph. Let l ij equal one if the link between b i and s j exists and zero otherwise. Then let t ij ≥ 0 be the amount transacted over l ij . If u i ≥ 0 is the unmet demand at b i , the maximum unmet demand can be computed by the nonlinear program in Figure 4 . Note that the addition of reserves can result in the need for still more reserves as demonstrated in the lower bound in Section 3.3.
By removing the objective and constraints that contain u i and changing the inequality or unless the initial supply had been supplemented by reserves.
We have a nonlinear program (Figure 4 ) to calculate the maximum demand left over in an unsuccessful graph. Nevertheless, the addition of reserves can result in the need for still more reserves as demonstrated in the lower bound in Section 3.3.
We have not been concerned here with the question of how links arise in the first place, i.e., what drives more vs. less links besides the minimal requirement to allow an exchange between a buyer and a seller. In the context of markets, the formation of the links in the first place would seem to require a model (e.g., [13] ) in which prices are discovered, e.g., through auctions or brokers, which (as discussed in more detail in [12] ) are left out of this model.
In some contexts [16] , increasing the number of links might lower the price of exchanges for some actors, or, policies such as the SmartGrid [1] , might for other reasons require many links. If the only penalty for adding links were the one-time cost of installing the links themselves, it would be unsurprising that the benefits of additional connectivity would, in time, outweigh its expense. Nevertheless our results provide another potential penalty for additional links between buyers and sellers that should be included in the cost-benefit calculation.
While we expect that most proposals to reduce reserve requirements would plan more than merely increased network connectivity, we have focused this study of the simple case in which only the connectivity has increased.
Therefore we don't expect to apply these results directly to any particular proposal but instead expect these results to be only a part of a systematic evaluation of such proposals. Nevertheless, our results suggest that the mere increase in connectivity of a sparse exchange network will be problematic unless the details of the topology are considered explicitly. In particular, as both theory and computations suggest, there is a range of connectivity in these networks that impose reserve requirements that might cancel out the advantages that more links would otherwise provide. 
